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In: Theorie und Gesellschaft 78
Inhalt; Einleitung; Teil I - Von der immanenten Kritik zur Sozialontologie; 1. Gesellschaftskritik; 1.1 Interne und externe Kritik; 1.2 Rationalität und Kritik; 1.3 Rekonstruktive und immanente Kritik; 2. Interpretation und immanente Kritik; 2.1 Michael Walzer: Der verbundene Kritiker; 2.2 Charles Taylors starke Hermeneutik; 2.3 »Praxis« und »Tradition« bei Alasdair MacIntyre; 2.4 Hermeneutische immanente Kritik und Gesellschaftstheorie; 3. Kritische Theorie der Gesellschaft und immanente Kritik; 3.1 Das Modell kommunikativer Rationalität; 3.2 Das anerkennungstheoretische Modell
In: Reclams Universal-Bibliothek
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, S. 1-22
ISSN: 1743-8772
In: Critical horizons: a journal of philosophy and social theory, S. 1-17
ISSN: 1568-5160
In: Global discourse: an interdisciplinary journal of current affairs and applied contemporary thought, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 20-39
ISSN: 2043-7897
Theories of recognition often acknowledge that some forms of recognition can be ideological. Only recently have authors also begun to ask whether all ideological phenomena involve a more basic form of misrecognition of epistemic agents. I argue that an expressivist reconstruction of the Marxian theory of ideology can help us to understand what forms of misrecognition are involved in ideology. According to this understanding, ideological discourses reflect the rules of hierarchical social practices and impose limits on the capacity of subjects to challenge dominant conceptual distinctions. While rational epistemic subjects will tend to experience such limits as misrecognition, this does not require any negative interpersonal attitudes on the part of others. Therefore, at least some forms of ideology involve primarily structural, rather than interpersonal, misrecognition. I argue that ideologies that persist without involving widespread false beliefs can best be understood in this way and that neoliberalism is a paradigmatic example of such an ideology.
In: Journal of social philosophy
ISSN: 1467-9833
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 135-158
ISSN: 1741-2730
It is sometimes argued that ideal theories in political philosophy are a form of ideology. This article examines arguments building on the work of Charles Mills and Raymond Geuss for the claim that ideal theories are cognitively distorting belief systems that have the effect of stabilizing unjust social arrangements. I argue that Mills and Geuss neither succeed in establishing that the content of ideal theories is necessarily cognitively defective in the way characteristic for ideologies, nor can they make plausible which mechanisms ensure the alleged negative effects of the widespread acceptance of ideal theorizing. This does not mean that all hope is lost for the ideology objection, however. By turning to a second Marxian model of ideology, I argue that the ideological character of ideal theories is not so much a matter of their content, but rather of their form. Ideal theories falsely present the normative concepts that they use as semantically practice-independent and thereby block potential challenges from subordinate groups to dominant ideologies. It is therefore not the normative content of ideal theories which proves to be objectionable, but the particular role their concepts play in wider political discourse.
In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 73-96
ISSN: 2194-5624
AbstractTraditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally public activities, such as political speech, do not deserve privacy protection. In this article, I develop a new argument for the view that surveillance of intentionally public activities should be limited to protect the specific good that this context provides, namely democratic legitimacy. Combining insights from Helen Nissenbaum's contextualism and Jürgen Habermas's theory of the public sphere, I argue that strategic surveillance of the public sphere can undermine the capacity of citizens to freely deliberate in public and therefore conflicts with democratic self-determination.
In: Stahl , T 2020 , ' Privacy in Public : A Democratic Defense ' , Moral Philosophy and Politics , vol. 7 , no. 1 , pp. 73-96 . https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0031 ; ISSN:2194-5624
Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally public activities, such as political speech, do not deserve privacy protection. In this article, I develop a new argument for the view that surveillance of inten- tionally public activities should be limited to protect the specific good that this context provides, namely democratic legitimacy. Combining insights from Helen Nissenbaum's contextualism and Jürgen Habermas's theory of the public sphere, I argue that strategic surveillance of the public sphere can undermine the capacity of citizens to freely deliberate in public and therefore conflicts with democratic self-determination.
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In: Critical horizons: a journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 1-21
ISSN: 1568-5160
In: Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory, Band 24, Heft 3, S. 482-485
ISSN: 1467-8675
In: The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Theory, S. 505-522
Recent disclosures suggest that many governments apply indiscriminate mass surveillance technologies that allow them to capture and store a massive amount of communications data belonging to citizens and non-citizens alike. This article argues that traditional liberal critiques of government surveillance that center on an individual right to privacy cannot completely capture the harm that is caused by such surveillance because they ignore its distinctive political dimension. As a complement to standard liberal approaches to privacy, the article develops a critique of surveillance that focuses on the question of political power in the public sphere.
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In: Stahl , T 2016 , ' Indiscriminate mass surveillance and the public sphere ' , Ethics and Information Technology , vol. 18 , no. 1 , pp. 33-39 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-016-9392-2 ; ISSN:1388-1957
Recent disclosures suggest that many governments apply indiscriminate mass surveillance technologies that allow them to capture and store a massive amount of communications data belonging to citizens and non-citizens alike. This article argues that traditional liberal critiques of government surveillance that center on an individual right to privacy cannot completely capture the harm that is caused by such surveillance because they ignore its distinctive political dimension. As a complement to standard liberal approaches to privacy, the article develops a critique of surveillance that focuses on the question of political power in the public sphere.
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